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Negotiating on un-Holy Land
The Road from Israel to Palestine
Randolph "Michael" Nacol II
INTRODUCTION: TENSIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST *
The Middle East is no stranger to conflict. In particular, the land currently
called "Israel"' has been through the hands of many dynasties and has long been
the center of religious development and identity. 2 Despite turmoil and failed
attempts at achieving peace, there is no excuse for complacency in resolving this
intolerable Israeli-Palestinian divide.' The conflict is arguably the longest, most
complicated, deep-seated, and vicious battle in modern history.4 This article
explores various fundamentals of negotiation and settlement with the hopes of
spurring ideas, and furthering an interest in how this great conflict might finally
be resolved.
Recognizing most topics and single events mentioned in the history of the
Middle East conflict have been the sole focus of entire books, or even volumes
of books, their depth of treatment in this article is intentionally shallow. The
* The author would like to thank Syndi and Buddy Lockett for their undying love, support,
and confidence. As is the case with all my achievements in life, you, along with the grace of the
Lord, have made this work possible. I thank you and love you both. I also extend warm thanks to
all my family in the Nacol, Moujaes, and Matar family-line for continually sharing their heritage and
hearts with me.
1. Bounded on the east by the Jordan River, on the west by the Mediterranean Sea, on the
north by Lebanon and on the south by the Sinai Peninsula. See map at
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/-middle-east andasia/middle east ref 2002.jpg.
2. See A History of Conflict, BBC ONLINE, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/
static/in..depthl-worldI200l/israel and-palestinianstimeline, for a full, in-depth history of the Mid-
dle East. References to this British news source are preferable over American, Israeli, or Palestinian
news sources, as the BBC tends to provide a more objective treatment of issues.
3. See UN Press Release SC/7848, Security Council 48 10th Meeting (AM), "Israelis, Pales-
tinians Need Courage, Determination to 'Stay the Course' on Middle East Road Map, Security
Council Told," Aug. 19, 2003, available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2003/sc7848.
docweb.doc.htm. Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, said despite setbacks, both
Israelis and Palestinians should be encouraged to "take risks for peace." Id.
4. See LAUREL HOLLIDAY, CHILDREN OF ISRAEL, CHILDREN OF PALESTINE: OUR OWN TRUE
STORIES (1999). Holliday presents both Israeli and Palestinian perspectives on enduring one of the
worlds longest, most dangerous conflicts. See also Allen McDuffee, For the Record, No. 75, Pales-
tine Center, Jun. 1, 2001, available at http://www.palestinecenter.org/cpap/pubs/2001060ftr.html.
McDuffee reports on the International Center in Bethlehem briefing given by Reverend Mitri Raheb,
pastor of Christmas Lutheran Church in Bethlehem and General Director of the International Center
in Bethlehem, on May 23, 2001, wherein Reverend Rehab states the conflict is the "longest ongoing
conflict in modem history." Id.
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first objective is to obtain a good sense of where we are today regarding the
Middle East and the position of the parties without regard to the equities in-
volved. Attention will be paid to past negotiation efforts in the Middle East,
noting both failures and successes to discern the types of negotiation tactics that
are most likely to succeed. After surveying this background, the principles of
negotiation will be explored as well as suggestions on how the parties might
pave the road to peace.
THE HISTORY OF THE MIDDLE EAST
The Biblical and Classical Ages
In 1250 B.C., the Holy Land was conquered by the Israelites who settled in
the land of Canaan.5 During the mid-900s B.C., this land, then ruled by King
Solomon, fell prey to the Babylonians, who drove the Jews into exile.6 The
Jews returned. As part of the spoils of Alexander the Great, he made the land
Greek in 333 B.C.7 In 165 B.C., the last independent Jewish state of ancient
times was established after a revolt in Judea, the southern portion of the king-
dom, which thereafter became incorporated into "Palestine"-the Roman prov-
ince housing the long-forgotten Philistines.'
In 30 A.D., Jesus Christ said, "forgive them Father, for they know not what
they do," as the Jews crucified Jesus on Calvary.9 The Romans quelled another
Jewish revolt in 70 A.D., and this time known as the "Diaspora" marked another
great Jewish dispersion."0 The Jews returned. After another unsuccessful Jew-
ish revolt between 118-138 A.D., Jerusalem was destroyed and its people were
sold into slavery." Some 500 years later, Arab Muslims ended the Byzantine
5. See supra note 2. A special thanks to Ali Reza Abootalebi, Associate Professor of Politi-
cal Science at the University of Wisconsin, Eau Claire and author of ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY:
STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 1980-1994 (2000). Mr. Abootalebi gra-
ciously assisted me in the structuring of this article.
6. See BERNARD LEWIS, THE MIDDLE EAST 'A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE LAST 2,000 YEARS'
29 (1995). Lewis gives an insightful description of the pre and post Christian era along with phi-
losophical, political, and economic progression dictated by the military conquests throughout the
millennia.
7. See id.; see also supra note 2.
8. See supra note 2 and LEwIs, supra note 6, at 31-33.
9. See Luke 23:24; see also Jesus Christ, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, retrieved Dec. 14,
2003, from Encyclopedia Britannica Premium Service, available at http://www.britannica.com/eb/
article?eu=109559.
10. See LEWIS, supra note 6, at 31; see also MARK TESSLER, A HISTORY OF THE ISRAELI-
PALESTINIAN CONFLICT 270 (1994). I found Tessler's book to be the most informative, well-
founded, and unbiased book on the conflict. It was of invaluable use to me in preparing this article
and should be of equal benefit to anyone wishing to engage in a more in depth study of the conflict.
I1. See LEWIS, supra note 6, at 31.
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rule - succeeding the Roman Empire in the East. 12 In the early 8th Century, the
second caliph of Islam, Omar, built a mosque presently known as the al-Aqsa
Mosque in Jerusalem. 3 Aside from the 12' Century, exhibiting a brief rule by
the Christian Crusaders, the land remained under Muslim rule until the end of
the Ottoman Empire in the 20"h Century. 4
DECLINE OF THE OTTOMANS, COLONIAL INTRUSION, AND THE RISE OF ARAB
AND JEWISH NATIONALISM
British Support of a Jewish Homeland Following WWI
The McMahon Letter (1915)
Sir Henry McMahon was British High Commissioner in Egypt and Ali Ibn
Hussein was the Sherif of Mecca during the First World War.'" The two com-
municated in a series of bargaining letters from 1915 to 1916, the most crucial
of which stated that Britain was prepared "to recognize and support the inde-
pendence of the Arabs in all the regions within the [demands of Sherif. . . in-
cluding Syria, Arabia and Mesopotamia]."' 6 The Arabs met this support by
offering their own support in Britain's stance against the Ottoman Empire. 7
This "firm and lasting alliance, the immediate results of which [was] the expul-
sion of the Turks from the Arab countries and the freeing of the Arab peoples
from the Turkish yoke"' 8 would soon turn sour as Britain ultimately had its own
plans with regards to the lands they promised to the Arabs. 9
The Sykes-Picot Agreement, 1916
The Sykes-Picot agreement was a covert agreement concluded in May
1916, during World War I, between Great Britain and France, with the acquies-
12. Id. at 35-36; see also supra notes 2 and 3.
13. See TESSLER, supra note 10, at 235.
14. See LEWIS, supra note 6, at 107, 342; see also supra note 2.
15. History of Palestine, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, retrieved Dec. 12, 2003, from Ency-
clopaedia Britannica Premium Service, available at http://www.britannica.com/eb/article?eu= 115038.
16. HOWARD M. SACHAR, HISTORY OF ISRAEL FROM THE RISE OF ZIONISM TO OUR TIME 92
(2d ed. 1996).
17. See supra note 15.
18. TESSLER, supra note 10, at 222.
19. See infra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
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cence of Russia, again for the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire.2" The
agreement led to the division of Turkish-held Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine
into various French and British-administered regions.2 A major event was Brit-
ain's insistence that Palestine be excluded from this negotiation, serving as a
great disappointment to the Arabs because they believed they were on the brink
of self-determination after being freed from Turkish tyranny.22 British troops
soon replaced the Turks in occupying Jerusalem.23
The Balfour Declaration, November 2, 1917
In 1917, British foreign secretary Lord Balfour sent a letter, recognizing for
the first time that Britain was sympathetic to a growing movement, Zionism,
which called for a Jewish homeland in Palestine.24 The letter said that His Maj-
esty's Government viewed "with favor the establishment in Palestine of a na-
tional home for the Jewish people ... it being clearly understood that nothing
shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-
Jewish communities in Palestine. '25 It became known as the Balfour Declara-
tion and is viewed in history as pivotal in the establishment of the state of Israel
31 years later.26
This was the first clear public showing that the British government sided
with the Zionists and was committed to assisting the Jews acquire Palestine as
their homeland.27  This Declaration came as a great shock to the Arabs, who
protested against the Balfour Declaration and demanded withdrawal of the
statements by the British. 28 Meanwhile, the Jews made themselves busy in buy-
20. Sykes-Picot Agreement, May 1916, available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/Avalon/
mideast/sykes.htm; see also TESSLER, supra note 10 at 147-48.
21. See supra note 15. In April 1920, at a peace conference held in San Remo, Italy, the
Allies mandated the northern portion including Syria and Lebanon to France, and the southern por-
tion, Palestine, to Great Britain. Id.
22. See TESSLER, supra note 10, at 147-58.
23. DAN COHN-SHERBOK & DAWOUD EL-ALAMI, A BEGINNER'S GUIDE-THE PALESTINIAN-
ISRAELI CONFLICT 102-03 (2002).
24. Id. at 103; see also LEWIS, supra note 6, at 348.
25. See COHN-SHERBOK & EL-ALAMI, supra note 23, at 103; see also NOAM CHOMSKY, THE
FATEFUL TRIANGLE 90 (1999).
26. See COHN-SHERBOK & EL-ALAMI, supra note 23, at 104.
27. Id.; see also EDWARD W. SAID, THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE 13 (1992). As Said de-
scribes:
Balfour's statements in the declaration take for granted the higher right of a colonial power
to dispose of a territory as it saw fit. As Balfour himself averred, this was especially true
when dealing with such a significant territory as Palestine and with such a momentous idea
as the Zionist idea, which saw itself as doing no less than reclaiming a territory promised
originally by God to the Jewish people, at the same time as it foresaw an end to the Jewish
problem. Id at 16.
28. See COHN-SHERBOK & EL-ALAMI, supra note 23, at 104; see also TESSLER, supra note 10
at 148-50.
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ing land, promoting agriculture, building schools and developing community
organizations.
29
In an effort to regain cooperation of the Arab populace, the British proposed
the establishment of an Arab Agency, modeled after the existing Jewish Agency,
to be in charge of the administration of social affairs for the non-Jewish popula-
tion. This Arab Agency would be available for consultation with regard to im-
migration to the extent that it would be detrimental to the non-Jewish popula-
tion.3" The Jewish and Arab Agency differed in that the Arab Agency only rep-
resented the interest of the indigenous Arab population, whereas the Jewish
Agency represented the ambitions of the worldwide Jewish community in Pales-
tine.3 The Arabs rejected the formation of such an agency.3 2
American Rejection of Peace Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919
The Versailles Conference was principally aimed at the dismemberment of
what was left of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires as well as meas-
ures against Germany. 33 The United States Senate rejected the Treaty of Ver-
sailles, membership in the League of Nations, and refused to accept a Mandate
to govern Armenia.34 Instead of joining these coalitions, the Department of
State began the process of legally asserting American rights in the occupied
Ottoman territories.
The King-Crane Report, August 28, 1919
The United States made its stand on the conflict when President Woodrow
Wilson made a proposal to the Supreme Council of the League of Nations on
29. See COHN-SHERBOK & EL-ALAMI, supra note 23, at 104.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 113-14.
33. See International Relations, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, retrieved Dec. 12, 2003, from
Encyclopedia Britannica Premium Service, available at http://www.britannica.com/eb/article?eu=
108373.
34. See DAVID FROMKIN, A PEACE TO END ALL PEACE: THE FALL OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE
AND THE CREATION OF THE MODERN MIDDLE EAST 533 (2001).
35. Id. Fromkin explains how the most conspicuous interest asserted by the United States was
that of American oil companies. Id. at 533-34. In September of 1919, Fromkin writes, a geologist
from an American company wrote his wife telling her "I am going to the biggest remaining oil
possibilities in the world... thee pie is so very big" that whatever had to be done should be done to
"gain us the rights which properly belong to American Citizens." Id. See also LORD KINROSS,
ATATURK: A BIOGRAPHY OF MUSTAFA KEMAL, FATHER OF MODERN TURKEY 226 (1965).
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March 20, 1919.36 The American appointed King-Crane Commission spent
three weeks in Palestine and Syria soliciting petitions from local inhabitants.
37
The Commission concluded that Syria should be put under either American or
British mandate with a monarchy ruled by Emir Faisal. 3' The Commission
warned that displacing the indigenous Palestinian population by land purchase
and military mobilization in order to enforce a mass Jewish immigration, a
scheme against the will of the overwhelming majority of the existing population,
would be a gross violation of the principles of self-determination. 39 However,
President Wilson had already expressed full support of the Balfour Declaration,
an idea consistent with the principles of Zionism. 4° Civil unrest arose in Jerusa-
lem in the spring of 1920 as factions demonstrated against both the British and
Jewish immigration.41 The response from Churchill would come in the form of
the "Churchill White Paper."4
The Churchill White Paper (1922)
This document stated in pertinent part:
[T]he terms of the Declaration referred to do not contemplate that Palestine as a whole should
be converted into a Jewish National Home, but that such a Home should be founded in Pales-
tine. In this connection it has been observed with satisfaction that at a meeting of the Zionist
Congress, the supreme governing body of the Zionist Organization, held at Carlsbad in Sep-
tember, 1921, a resolution was passed expressing as the official statement of Zionist aims "the
36. See Recommendations of the King-Crane Commission on Syria and Palestine, Aug. 28,
1919, available at http://www.palestinecenter.org/cpap/documents/recommendations.html; see also
King-Crane Commission, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, retrieved Dec. 12, 2003, from Ency-
clop.edia Britannica Premium Service, available at http://www.britannica.com/eb/articleeu=46578.
The commission discovered the vast majority of Arabs favored an independent Syria, and that of the
1,875 petitions collected, 72 percent were openly opposed to the Zionist plan for a Jewish national
home in Palestine. Id. The commission advised serious modification of the Zionist immigration
policy in Palestine in light of such findings. Id.
37. Id.
38. I suggest this is less of an isolated event and more of a systematic pattern resulting from
real-politik policy instituted by powerful nations. This proposition is reinforced by the recent activ-
ity in Iraq, arguably now under British and U.S. mandate, and President Bush's recent ousting of
Liberian President Charles Taylor, precipitated by U.S. military intervention. See Timeline: Iraq,
BBC ONLINE, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/himiddle-eastlcountry-profiles/737483.stm, for
U.S. and Britain efforts in dismantling Saddam Hussein's regime. See Timeline: Liberia, BBC
ONLINE, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi-/africa/country-profiles/1043567.stm, for the U.S.'
role in ousting Charles Taylor.
39. See supra note 36.
40. ESCO Foundation, Palestine, Vol. I, 213-22; for details on the King-Crane findings, see
LAQUEUR AND RUBIN, THE ISRAEL-ARAB READER 21-27 (1984); available at
http://www.mideastweb.org/1922wp.htm.
41. See TESSLER, supra note 10, at 238.
42. See The Churchill White Paper, Jun. 3, 1922,Yale University Avalon Project, available at
http://www.yale.edullawweb/-avalon/avalon.htm. It includes a wealth of documents in law, history,
and diplomacy.
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determination of the Jewish people to live with the Arab people on terms of unity and mutual
respect, and together with them to make the common home into a flourishing community, the
upbuilding of which may assure to each of its peoples an undisturbed national development.
43
This document also established an open immigration policy.' More impor-
tantly, a commission was established to facilitate Jewish immigration, while
ensuring it would not be to the detriment of the local population.45
The Mandate for Palestine, July 24, 1922
Negotiations between Great Britain and the United States with regard to the
Palestine mandate were successfully concluded in May 1922, and approved by
the Council of the League of Nations in July 1922.46 The Mandate recognized
the "historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine" and the "grounds
for reconstituting their national home in that country."47 The mandates for Pal-
estine and Syria came into force simultaneously on September 29, 1922.48
Until 1929, there were no major obstacles hindering Jewish development,
nor were there any measures in place that stood as a bar to Jewish immigration
into Palestine.49 The Jews and Arabs were even cooperative in such things as
the Dead Sea concession, a mining agreement for the extraction of minerals and
salts from the Dead Sea that was headed by a strong British board of directors
and driven by a good working relationship between both Jews and Palestinian
Arabs.5° In 1929, however, a civil unrest took place known as the "Wailing
Wall Crisis."'" Jews revere one of the last vestiges of the Temple of Solomon,
the Wailing Wall, which forms part of the large platform on which the two Is-
lamic monuments, Aqsa Mosque and Dome of the Rock stand.5" The Dome of
the Rock is the spot considered by Muslims to be the location of the gate
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See Palestine, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, retrieved Dec. 15, 2003, from Encyclopaedia
Britannica Premium Service, available at http://www.britannica.com/eb/article?eu=l 15038.
47. Palestine Mandate, available at http://www.yale.edullawweb/avalon/mideast/palmanda.htm.
48. See TESSLER, supra note 10, at 222.
49. Id.
50. See Report by His Majesty's Government to the Council of the League of Nations on the
Administration of Palestine and Trans-Jordan for the Year 1929, available at
http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/0/-38bed 104db074b49052565e70054eb22?OpenDocument; see
also TESSLER, supra note 10, at 181-83 (describing other instances of Jewish and Arab coopera-
tion.).
51. See COHN-SHERBOK & EL-ALAMI, supra note 23, at chapter 8.
52. See TESSLER, supra note 10, at 316-17.
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through which Mohammed was carried to heaven by the mythical creature al-
Buraq.53 This area, therefore, has great importance to both Muslims and Jews.54
In 1928, immediately prior to Yom Kippur, a segregation screen for women was
installed on the pavement beside the wall, bringing about Palestinian unrest; this
upset the Jews who saw the unrest as discrediting their holy day. " These ten-
sions resulted in violence in August of 1929,56 whereby the British responded in
sending more troops to the region.
57
From this point on, the strength of the Palestinians' nationalist movement
began to diminish, as evidenced by the rejection of Palestinian-proposed immi-
gration restrictions by the British Prime Minister.58 The Israeli-Palestinian crisis
next evidenced itself in 1936 with repeated Arab attacks followed by calculated
Jewish retaliations.5 9 The noted importance of this incident was that "it can be
seen as a general pattern that the only really effective action in the history of the
Palestinian struggle up to the present day has been spontaneous popular upris-
ing. ' After this uprising, the Palestinians publicly declared their primary en-
emy would be the British, who were responsible for the mass Zionist immigra-
tion, rather than the Zionists themselves, and that the struggle should not end
until Palestinian demands were satisfied.6'
The Jews took an official position that the interests of the Jews and Arabs
were inherently reconcilable; this was in line with the Churchill White Paper and
Balfour Declaration that the welfare, language, religion and culture of the Arab
population should not be prejudiced, and that the Jews were resolved to live in
harmony with the Arabs. 62 The Palestinians denounced the Jewish right to their
homeland, objecting to the loss of land, increased cost of living, and loss of jobs
53. See id. at 77-82, exploring Islam, and political and military skill enabling Muhammad to
build his empire and write the now "un-translatable" word of God in the Quran; see also ABRAM
LEON SAACHAR, A HISTORY OF THE JEWS 129 (1964); Quran 17:1, for Muhammad's overnight
journey from the "Sacred Mosque to the Farthest Mosque."
54. See COHN-SHERBOK & EL-ALAMI, supra note 23, at 104.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See ESCO FOUNDATION FOR PALESTINE, PALESTINE: A STUDY OF JEWISH, ARAB AND
BRITISH POLICIES 294-95, VOL. 1 (1947), for a detailed account of the Shaw Commission findings
and British troop involvement.
58. Id.
59. This is the cycle all too familiar today, especially during 2002-2003 as Sharon, operating
under Bush's "terror agenda" musters up increased courage to increase the strength of "retaliations"
to Palestinian's main weapon: the suicide bomber-aka "the martyr." See Timeline: Mid-East
Bloodshed, BBC ONLINE, Sep. 10, 2003, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle-eastl
3098090.stm.
60. See COHN-SHERBOK & EL-ALAMi, supra note 23, at 119.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 121.
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and discrimination against Arabs in employment - in effect calling for with-
drawal of the Jewish National Home policy.
6 3
A British Royal Commission determined the unrest could be attributed to
two key factors: the desire for Arab national independence, and fear of the estab-
lishment of a Jewish National Home.' As we explore the negotiation process,
these two factors remain paramount in considering the possibility of settlement
between the parties. 65 In response to Arab complaints, the Commission asserted
that the statistical measures evidenced that the condition of the Arab population
was better under the British administration than it had ever been under Ottoman
rule. 6 However, as we evaluate the negotiating process, we must now refute
such a position since under current international law, such responses to injus-
tices no longer suffice to explain away a people's suffering.67
The White Paper (1939)
The British White Paper of 1939 was issued to satisfy mounting Arab pres-
sure against further Jewish immigration and colonization of Palestine. 68 The
first attempt of Britain to control Jewish immigration, the Passfield White Paper
of 1930, evoked considerable opposition from the Zionist movement and was
rescinded in a letter issued to Haim Weizmann.69 Increased Jewish immigration
soon provoked widespread riots in 1936.70
The White Paper of 1939 stated, "His Majesty's Government believes that
the framers of the Mandate in which the Balfour Declaration was embodied
could not have intended that Palestine should be converted into a Jewish State
against the will of the Arab population of the country."'" Furthermore, it pro-
claimed "His Majesty's Government therefore now declares unequivocally that
63. Id.; see also TESSLER, supra note 10, at 133-40, discussing Zionism and Palestinian Ar-
abs.,
64. Id.
65. See Country Profile: Israel and Palestinian Autonomous Areas, BBC ONLINE, available
at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle-eastlcountry-profles/803257.stm. "The division of the former
British mandate of Palestine and the creation of the state of Israel in the years after the end of World
War II have been at the heart of Middle Eastern conflicts for the past half century." Id.
66. Id.
67. See International Human Rights Convention, available at http:I/www. unhchr.ch/udhr/
index.htm.
68. At that time some 80,000 Jews had relocated to Palestine. The British White Paper is
available online at http://www.yale.edullawweb/avalon/mideast/ brwh 1922.htm.
69. See TESSLER, supra note 10, at 222.
70. Id.
71. See supra note 68.
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it is not part of their policy that Palestine should become a Jewish State.,1 2
However, the key portion dealing with immigration stated, "Jewish immigration
during the next five years will be at a rate which, if economic absorptive capac-
ity permits, will bring the Jewish population up to approximately one third of the
total population of the country."73 The "Administration of Palestine ... [was]
required to facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions."74 Further
portions of the paper include in pertinent part: "[Palestine] should be a State in
which the two peoples in Palestine, Arabs and Jews, share authority in govern-
ment in such a way that the essential interests of each are shared."75
The Zionist Reaction to the White Paper (1939)
Speaking for the Jews, the League Mandates Commission declared the
White Paper to be illegal, stating, "[T]he policy set out in the White Paper is not
in accordance with the interpretation which, in agreement with the Mandatory
Power and the Council, the Commission has placed upon the Palestine Man-
date."76 The British continued to enforce the provisions of the White Paper,
nonetheless; however, since the gates of Europe had been closed to the Jews,
their efforts had little practical effect.77 A group of Arab delegates journeyed to
Versailles to vocalize their desires and aspirations, but they were ignored.78
UN General Assembly Resolution 181 (Partition Plan) November 29, 1947
Great Britain finally acknowledged publicly in 1947 that it was not within
London's power to impose a settlement in Palestine by turning the matter over
to the United Nations, which created an eleven-member Special Committee on
Palestine (UNSCOP). 79 The UNSCOP's ultimate proposal included the territo-
72. Id.
73. Id. The Paper continues to explain that "[tiaking into account the expected natural in-
crease of the Arab and Jewish populations, and the number of illegal Jewish immigrants now in the
country, this would allow the admission, as from the beginning of April [of 1939], of some 75,000
immigrants over the next five years." Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. (emphasis added).
76. See supra note 36 and accompanying text; see also HAIM WEIZMANN, TRIAL AND ERROR
509 (1949).
77. See WEIZMANN, supra note 76, at 509.
78. See COHN-SHERBOK & EL-ALAMI, supra note 23, at 103; see also MUSA MAZZAWI,
PALESTINE AND THE LAW. GUIDELINES FOR THE RESOLUTION OF THE ARAB ISRAELI CONFLICT 19-
24 (1997).
79. See MICHAEL T. BENSON, FROM HARRY S. TRUMAN AND THE FOUNDING OF ISRAEL
(Raymond H. Geselbracht ed., 1997); Truman Presidential Museum and Library Online, available at
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/israeVpalestin.htm ("The British government announces that it will
terminate its mandate for Palestine" and announces that it will refer the problem of the future of
10
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [2003], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol4/iss1/4
[Vol. 4: 87, 2003]
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL
rial divisions proposed for the Arab and Jewish states "to be composed of three
noncontiguous regions."' The Arabs were to be awarded the western part of
Galilee and the Negev was attached to the Zionist state, giving the Jews 56 per-
cent of the country. 8
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181 called for the partition of
the British-ruled Palestine Mandate into a Jewish state and an Arab state.82 The
UN General Assembly endorsed the partition resolution on November 29, 1947
by a vote of thirty-three to thirteen with ten abstentions, a vote narrowly meeting
the two-thirds requirement for passage. 83 The Jews in Palestine accepted the
resolution, yet the Arabs in Palestine and the Arab states rejected the resolu-
tion."
War broke out as the Palestinians raised a guerrilla army to resist imple-
mentation of the Resolution." Three phases of fighting followed 6 and by the
end, the Jewish state had signed armistice agreements with all of its neighbors
Palestine to the United Nations"); see also report of UNSCOP - 1947, available at http://www.-
mideastweb.org/unscop 1947.htm.
80. TESSLER, supra note 10, at 259.
81. Id.
82. Resolution 181, available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalonlun/resl81.htm. Most
notable in the proposal was "the overall territorial pattern, which allowed each state to intersect and
separate the provinces of the other," a plan "described by one British scholar as two fighting serpents
entwined in an inimical embrace." TESSLER, supra note 10, at 259. Furthermore, "the majority
proposed that the two states establish by treaty a formal economic union, and then added that the
independence of neither state should be recognized until such a treaty had been signed. Id. Finally
the proposal envisioned an international enclave surrounding Jerusalem and extending as far south as
Bethlehem." Id. The Arab opposition to the proposal consisted of a charge that the UN had no right
to grant the Zionists any portion of their territory and that the "Western world was seeking to salve
its conscience for the atrocities of the war and was paying its own debt to the Jewish people with
someone else's land." Id.
83. TESSLER, supra note 10, at 261.
84. Id. at 259; see also LEWIS, supra note 6, at 343-44.
85. TESSLER, supra note 10, at 261-65. After the guerrilla army failed, Egypt, Jordan, Iraq,
and Syria attacked Israel on May 15, 1948. Id. The Jewish Agency announced that it would regard
an invasion by Arab armies as releasing Israel from the obligations of the UN resolution. Id. For a
Palestinian viewpoint, claiming the attacks of May 15 resulted in more than 400 Palestinian towns
being destroyed, see Palestinian Refugees, Population of Palestine after May 15, 1948, available at
http://www.palestinerefugees.org/-HTML/popafter.htm.
86. TESSLER, supra note 10, at 264. Each phase of fighting added to the territory under Israeli
control. The first phase ended peaceably, and the second phase - referred to as the "Ten Days
War" - resulted in Israeli forces seizing territory in the Galilee and the Tel Aviv-Jerusalem corridor
that the UN had allocated to the proposed Palestinian state, and an Israeli forfeiture of that land in
the Negev so allocated to the Jews. Id. During the final phase, Israeli forces expelled Egyptian
forces from the Negev, extending its control to the borders of Sinai, a further capture of land origi-
nally allocated to the Palestinians in partition resolution. Id. at 264.
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- Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Syria - which now stood as Israel's offi-
cial boundaries.87
Palestine disappears
When the armistices were drawn, the West Bank, originally to be granted to
the Palestinians under the UN Partition Resolution, was in the hands of Arabs,
not Palestinians.88 The land remained in such hands until the West Bank was
annexed by Transjordan under the control of King Abdullah, who upon annex-
ing forbid using the word "Palestine" to be used in the official decree.89 By
insisting that the term "West Bank" rather than "Palestine" be used it was now
clear that there would be no separate Palestinian state." Effectively, the state of
Palestine had disappeared off the map.9' The fact the UN would later pass Reso-
lution 194 in December of 1948, calling for the return of Palestinian refugees,
compensation for damaged property, and a commission to direct their social and
economic rehabilitation, would be of no consequence as Israel proved to only
dig its heels further into the land they now had won.92
According to UN figures, the number of Palestinian refugees reached
750,000 at the beginning of 1949; that figure rose to 940,000 by June of that
year.93 "The extent to which Palestinian psychology is marked by the events of
this period cannot be overemphasized."'94 Many refugees suffered a loss of not
only their land and home, but were also cut off from their families who lived in
states with which Israel remained at war.9 5
'"The Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel," May 14, 1948
On May 14, 1948, the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel
asserted "it is the natural right of the Jewish people to be masters of their own
fate, like all other nations, in their own sovereign state."96 Its preamble de-
clared:
87. Id. at 260.
88. Id. at 276.
89. Id. at 276. See also Wikipedia Encyclopedia Online, West Bank, available at
http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/WestBank.
90. TESSLER, supra note 10, at 276.
91. Id. at 278.
92. Id. at 279-84.
93. Daoud Kuttab, A Profile of the Stonethrowers, 67 J. OF PALESTINE STUDIES 18, 18-20
(1988).
94. TESSLER, supra note 10, at 281.
95. Id. For all practical purposes Israel remains politically "at war" with nearly every other
Middle Eastern country. See infra note 234; see also, e.g., U.S. Blocks Action on Israeli "Wall,"
BBC ONLINE, Oct. 15, 2003, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middleeast/3192762.stm.
96. TESSLER, supra note 10, at 269-71. The Declaration is available at http://www.mfa.gov.i/
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The Land of Israel was the birthplace of the Jewish people. Here their spiritual, religious and
national identity was formed. Here they achieved independence and created a culture of na-
tional and universal significance. Here they wrote and gave the Bible to the world .... WE
DO HEREBY PROCLAIM the establishment of the Jewish State in Palestine to be called
Medinath Yisrael [meaning the State of Israel].
97
Having achieved independence, this is the test the Jewish people had his-
torically longed for: to demonstrate that Jewish values could give prosperity and
meaning to a modern nation-state.95
The Law of Return (1950)
In 1950, the Israeli parliament passed the Law of Return, giving further
substance to the Jewish character of the state.99 The Law of Return declared that
every Jew has the right to immigrate to Israel and become a citizen, and citizen-
ship could only be withheld in the case of "acts against the Jewish nation" or on
a threat to public health or state security. 1°° The Law further specified, "every
Jew who migrated to the country before this law goes into effect, and every Jew
who was born in the country either before or after the law is effective, enjoys the
same status as any person who migrated on the basis of this law.'' ° This con-
firmed that Israel was to be the state of the entire worldwide Jewish people.0 2
The United Nations' preferred treatment of Jerusalem as a corpus separatum
supported this Jewish effort. °3
Arab Reaction to Israeli Victory
In the words of Gamal Abdul Nasser who became president of Egypt in
1954, the Israeli victory was a "smear on the entire Arab nation" and that "the
shame brought on by the Battle of 1948" could never be forgotten." Thereaf-
mfa/-go.aspMFAHOOhbO.
97. TESSLER, supra note 10, at 269-71; see also SACHAR, supra note 16, at 310-11.
98. TESSLER, supra note 10, at 269-71.
99. Id.
100. The Law of Return, available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAOOOkpO; see also
SACHAR, supra note 16, at 383-84.
101. Id.
102. HELENA COBBAN, THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION: PEOPLE, POWER AND
POLITIcs 269 (1984).
103. See G.A. Res. 303 U.N.GAOR, 40' Sess., U.N. Doc. A/Res/303 (1949), available at
http://www.mideastweb.org/ga303.htm.
104. TESSLER, supra note 10, at 284. Nasser spoke these words to a contingent of Egyptian
soldiers in 1963. Id.
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ter, the two main issues dominating the thinking about the Arab-Israeli conflict
were the legitimacy of the State of Israel and fate of the Palestinian refugees.' 5
One common notion espoused by the Arabs was that the creation of Israel was
illegal and that the State itself was therefore illegitimate.1 °" Arabs, both then and
now, absolutely rejected any attempt to destroy the Arab character of Pales-
tine.0 7 Contrasting that sentiment with the words of Abba Eban, the Israeli
foreign minister at the time, demonstrates the deep divide in the parties' per-
spectives:
Palestine, the Arabs claim, is theirs by right of prior possession. It is an argument which
many decent people rightly concerned with the humanitarian aspects of the Palestine refugees
accept as gospel. It happens to be false, or, at best, only partly true .... There is no greater
falsehood in history than that the Arabs are the sole, legitimate heirs to the lands of an Israel
that once was Palestine and before that was Canaan.
108
The Jews, on the other hand, derived their rights from Biblical times when
God told Abraham, patriarch of the ancient Hebrews, that his descendants would
have all the land of Canaan "for an everlasting possession."'" Because Canaan
was the center of Jewish life until the Romans drove the Hebrews into exile, the
Jews believed their ancient association with the territory gave them the right to
self-determination." Some question the legitimacy of the State of Israel under
international law principles, suggesting the Balfour Declaration provides no
judicial authority to Zionist claims to constitute the Jewish people as a national
entity or confer membership in it."' Another argument is that Israel exceeds the
limits of international law by attempting to confer nationality on Jews who do
not reside within its borders." 2 For many, however, arguments surrounding the
legitimacy of Israel's creation faded into the more important concerns of achiev-
ing a peaceful coexistence between Israel and the Palestinians." 3
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. SADAM HADAWI, BITTER HARVEST: PALESTINE 1914-1967 (1967). Hadawi is the head of
the Institute for Palestine Studies in Beirut. See also generally TESSLER, supra note 10, at 285.
108. FRANK GERVASI, THE CASE FOR ISRAEL 11 (1967).
109. Genesis 17:8; TESSLER, supra note 10, at 287.
110. TESSLER, supra note 10, at 288.
Ill. See TESSLER, supra note 10, at 289; see also generally W.T. Mallison, Jr., The Zionist-
Israel Juridical Claims to Constitute the Jewish People' Nationality Entity and to Confer Member-
ship in It: Appraisal in Public International Law, 32 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 983 (1964). Tessler
speaks in Mallison's words and cites a resolution adopted by the League of Nations and Article 389,
paragraph 3, of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, which declares Israel's creation to be
illegal because "the obligation to withhold recognition from new States falls upon all members of the
international community when the creation of these new States is accompanied by manifest irregu-
larities or by acts of violence." Id. The report is published by the Institute for Palestine Studies
(1968). See also THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT, VOL. 1: READINGS (John Norton Moore ed., 1974).
112. See generally Mallison, supra note I II; TESSLER, supra note 10, at 289.
113. See TESSLER, supra note 10, at 289.
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First International Land for Peace Initiative Fails
U.N. Security Council Resolution 242
November 22, 1967: With growing support for the notion that Israel should
relinquish the land captured during preceding conflicts, U.S. President Lyndon
Johnson proposed to an Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly a
return of these lands to the Arabs in exchange for peace." 4 After redrafting by
UN member states, the United Nations passed UN Security Council Resolution
242 that stated in pertinent part:
Withdrawal of Israel[i] armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict ... [and
a] ... [t]ermination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledge-
ment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the
area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats
or acts of force.
115
Israel publicly endorsed the document and the Arab countries accepted the
idea that the exchange of peace for land envisioned in UN Resolution 242 could
be carried out simultaneously, rather than in stages that must begin with an Is-
raeli withdrawal. 1
6
However, due to the ambiguity of the Resolution, settlement broke down.
Israel claimed that the withdrawal "from territories occupied in the recent con-
flict" referred to an area upon which no agreement had been met, while the Ar-
abs insisted the clear language ordered Israel's complete withdrawal from all
territories in question." 7 When yet another impasse arose, the UN Special Rep-
resentative mediating the conflict explained after a failed trip to enact the meas-
ure that "there was no further move that he could usefully make at that stage."
'
"
18
This initiative, "Land for Peace," first intended as a solution, remains more of a
description of the problem than any hope of remedy it ever posed." 9
114. Id. at 414.
115. UN S.C. Res. 242 U.N. (1967).
116. SAADIA TOUVAL, THE PEACE BROKERS: MEDIATORS IN ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT 1948-
1979, 145 (1982).
117. TESSLER, supra note 10, at 422.
118. TOUVAL, supra note 116, at 153. Touval describes a United Nations representative's
attempts and failure to reach an implementation of the matter. Id.
119. TESSLER, supra note 10, at 421-22.
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The Palestine National Army and Palestinian Guerrilla Groups
Lead by Yasser Arafat, the Palestinian's largest guerrilla combat group, the
Fatah, broke from the Palestinian Liberation Organization (hereinafter "PLO")
and completed nearly forty commando raids against the Jews by the end of
1965.120 As Syria sheltered and supported the Palestinian guerrillas, the overall
impact on an increasingly retaliatory Israel became significant.12 ' This friction
would soon ignite the infamous War of June 1967.122
After Damascus stated publicly that it would now "attack defined targets
and bases of aggression" inside the State of Israel, Egypt signed a mutual de-
fense pact with Syria in an effort to try and restrain Syria from contributing to a
major Arab-Israeli confrontation. 2 3 Syria's refusal to allow Egyptian military
on Syrian soil, however, thwarted the Egyptian initiative and Egypt, arguably
controlled by the actions of its "ally" Syria, was effectively drawn into a war
with the State of Israel. 24 The Israeli Defense Forces (hereinafter "IDF") in-
vaded the West Bank on November 13, 1967 after a massive strike, and the UN
Security Council issued a formal rebuke of Israel's conduct.'25 In response,
Israel asserted "that so long as the UN failed to stop attacks upon it by the Syri-
ans and the Palestinians, Israel would have no choice but to defend itself in
whatever manner appropriate."' 2 6 This "Six Day War," oddly enough encour-
aged by the Soviet Union, ultimately ended in a devastating defeat for Egypt and
Syria and a glowing victory for Israel, who gained more land, particularly the
Egyptian Sinai Peninsula.1
2 7
120. See COBBAN, supra note 102, at 33; see also infra notes 151-55 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the creation of the PLO.
121. Id.; see also FREDJ. KHOURI, THE ARAB-ISRAELI DILEMMA 230-31 (3d ed. 1985). Israeli
sources claim that Fatah raids began in January 1966, the majority of which were launched from
Jordan or Lebanon.
122. Id.
123. See COBBAN, supra note 102, at 232.
124. TESSLER, supra note 10, at 378.
125. Id. at 380.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 397. The Soviet Union intervened by telling Syria that intelligence showed an
accumulation of Israeli troops heading for Damascus, and along with the rumor of Israeli leader
Rabin's rumored statement that "[w]e will carry out a lighting attack on Syria, occupy Damascus,
overthrow the regime there and come back," a war was born. Id. 11,500 Egyptian soldiers died, of
whom 1,500 were officers. Id. Only 66 Israeli soldiers were killed. Id. See also Israeli MFA
Online, available at www.israel-mfa.gov.illmfa/go.asp?MFAHdy7O; see also ROGER FISHER &
WILLIAM URY, GETTING To YES 42-43 (Bruce Patton ed., 2d ed. 1991).
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Al Fatah's Seven Points - Pushing for Palestine (1969)
In January 1969, the Central Committee of Fatah adopted a seven-point
declaration proclaiming "the final objective of [Fatah's] struggle is the restora-
tion of the independent, democratic State of Palestine, all of whose citizens will
enjoy equal rights regardless of their religion."' 28 The Palestinian authorities
pledged, "The Palestinians will keep on struggling, as they have always done, of
the liberation of Palestine and for the erection of [this] progressive democratic
state." 2 9 This ideological shift had its greatest impact in affecting the percep-
tion of the international community. Whereas the Palestinians were previously
viewed as refugees in need of humanitarian aid, they now could be perceived as
a stateless people with a legitimate political agenda. 3 °
Retrying "Land for Peace" - Kissinger's International Diplomacy
UN Security Council Resolution 338
In October 1973, Henry Kissinger undertook an international diplomatic
initiative while serving as both the U.S. Secretary of State and Richard Nixon's
National Security Advisor.'3 1 This lead to the UN Security Council's adopting
Resolution 338, calling for a ceasefire and reaffirming the provisions of UN
Resolution 242.'32 Believing Egypt and Syria to be willing negotiators with
128. The Seven Points, passed by the Central Committee of Fatah, Jan. 1969; reprinted in
LAQUEUR, THE ISRAEL-ARAB READER: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE MIDDLE EAST
CONFLICT 372-73 (Walter and Barry Rubin, eds., 1984). This document, contra UN Resolution
242, lead to this proposition made by Yasser Arafat to the Jews in Palestine: "The creation of a
democratic Palestinian state for all those who wish to live in peace on the land of peace... an inde-
pendent, progressive, democratic State of Palestine, which will guarantee equal rights to all its citi-
zens, regardless of race or religion. "An Interview with 'Abu Ammar' [Yasser Arafat]," Free Pales-
tine, Aug. 1969, reprinted. Id. See also ALAIN GRESH, THE PLO: THE STRUGGLE WITHIN, TOWARD
AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE 44 (1985).
129. ISMAIL SHAMMOUT, PALESTINE: ILLUSTRATED POLITICAL HISTORY 43 (1972). Sham-
mout recounts the Palestinian vow as set forth in the PLO handbook published in Beirut in 1972. Id.
130. TESSLER, supra note 10, at 424-34.
131. Id. at 480.
132. Id. at 480; see also WILLIAM B. QUANDT, DECADE OF DECISIONS: AMERICAN POLICY
TOWARD THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT 207(1977). For additional accounts, see generally EDWARD
R. F. SHAHAN, THE ARABS, ISRAELIS, AND KISSINGER: A SECRET HISTORY OF AMERICAN
DIPLOMACY IN THE MIDDLE EAST (1976) and MATri GOLAN, SECRET CONVERSATIONS WITH
HENRY KISSINGER: STEP-BY-STEP DIPLOMACY IN THE MIDDLE EAST (1976).
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Israel (itself suffering from a dragging, post-war economy), Kissinger attempted
to implement the land-for-peace formula on a step-by-step basis.1
3
After shuttling between Cairo, Jerusalem and Damascus, two disengage-
ment-of- forces agreements occurred: one between Israel and Egypt, and one
between Israel and Syria. These two agreements were accomplished in 1974. "'
The first agreement between Jerusalem and Egypt created three contiguous terri-
torial strips roughly five miles wide in the western Sinai between the Mediterra-
nean and the Gulf of Suez; Egypt controlled the western-most strip, the middle
strip acted as a buffer zone controlled by United Nations forces, and Israel
agreed to limit the strength of its forces in the eastern-most strip.'35 Similar
agreements were made between Israel and Syria regarding land in the Golan
Heights.'36 A second agreement, made after Kissinger's promise that the U.S.
would not recognize the Palestinian liberation movement unless the Palestinian
authorities accepted Israel's right to exist under UN Resolution 242, brought
another pullback of IDF forces and enabled Cairo to regain more of the Sinai
Peninsula.'37 Thus, the wheels of progress began to slowly roll as Kissinger's
incremental approach proved worthwhile.
Yasser Arafat: Address to the UN General Assembly (1974)
A great step for Palestinian recognition came with Yasser Arafat's invita-
tion to address the United Nations in November of 1974.138 After being wel-
comed before the UN assembly in New York, Arafat told the delegates of the
Palestinian people's dream to "return from exile and share in the building of a
state where Christian, Jew and Muslim live in justice, equality, fraternity and
progress."' 3 9 After the speech the UN passed a resolution giving international
recognition to the "inalienable rights" of the Palestinian people, including "the
133. Id.; see also supra note 16, at 752-80. Note the step-by-step approach was new, and at-
tributable to Kissinger because the prior UN Resolution 242 called for immediate implementation.
134. See SACHAR, supra note 16, at 795-96; see also TESSLER, supra note 10, at 481.
135. TESSLER, supra note 10, at 481.
136. Id.
137. See SACHAR, supra note 16, at 795-96; see also TESSLER, supra note 10, at 481. The IDF,
the Israeli Defense Force, is Israel's major military force. See also FISHER AND URY, supra note
127, at 41-45.
138. See Up Close with Yasser Arafat, BBC ONLINE, Feb. 7, 2002, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middleeast/1807449.stm. In the speech to the UN, Mr. Arafat waved a
leafy branch overhead, saying, "I come bearing an olive branch in one hand." Id. Then he pulled out
a pistol and said, "And the freedom fighter's gun in the other. Do not let the olive branch fall from
my hand." Id.
139. Id. at 485; UN General Assembly resolutions 3236 (XXIX) and 3237 (XXIX), found in
United Nations Monthly Chronicle 11 (December 1974): 36-37, available at
http://domino.un.org/unispalselect.nsf/9a798adbf322aff385256I7b006d88d7/025974039acfb
171852560de00548bbe!OpenDocument; see LAQUEUR, supra note 128, at 504-18 (containing
Arafat's address).
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right to self-determination without external interference" and "the right to na-
tional independence and sovereignty."'40
"Camp David Accords," September 17, 1978
In the Camp David Accords, U.S. President Jimmy Carter urged Egypt's
Sadat and Israel's Begin to come to peaceful terms over control of the West
Bank and Gaza during a twelve-day summit. 4 ' Egyptian President Sadat said,
"The Palestinian people and their legitimate rights are no longer denied today by
anybody; that is nobody who has the ability of judgment can deny or ignore it. It
is an acknowledged fact, perceived in the world community, both in the East and
in the West." 142 With the help of President Carter, Cairo and Jerusalem came to
terms as Israel and Egypt agreed to negotiate a peace treaty in good faith and
withdraw the IDF, re-establishing Egyptian sovereignty over Sinai.'
43
While claims to Sinai were resolved, the rights of the Palestinians in Gaza
and the West Bank, governed by the new "Framework for Peace in the Middle
East," fell into another quagmire."' The downfall of this portion of the accord,
however, was its ambiguity in dealing with Israeli withdrawal - Israel taking
the position that they had only promised to negotiate at Camp David, instead of
promising to actually withdraw.'45 Ultimately, the Israelis made good on their
promises of negotiating, but not sufficient enough to satisfy the Arab expecta-
tions.'" All that materialized from these negotiations was the initiation of the
140. TESSLER, supra note 10, at 485. Tessler refers to UN General Assembly Resolutions 3236
(XXIX) and 3237 (XXIX) respectively. These resolutions are available in United Nations Monthly
II, Dec. 1974: 36-37. The UN also granted a resolution granting UN observer status to the PLO. Id.
This was Arafat's first victory in establishing the PLO as the legitimate representative authority of
the Palestinian people. Id.; see also infra notes 151-55 and accompanying text, describing the crea-
tion of the PLO.
141. TESSLER, supra note 10, at 510.
142. Id. at 5 10-11.
143. Id. at 512.
144. Id. at 514. The Framework was supposed to determine the rights of the Palestinians under
the provisions of UN Security Council Resolution 242. It may have been expected by some that
reference to an earlier disputed Resolution would only end in further dispute between the parties.
145. Id. at 515. Mainly the conflict arose as the Egyptian Arabs expected full withdrawal from
the disputed territories in return for recognition of Israel while the Israelis claimed that the Camp
David Accords only regarded a promise to participate in negotiations about the future of the West
Bank and Gaza. Id. In addition, the same arguments still existed which surrounded Resolution 242.
Id.
146. Id. at 516.
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"peace process," which although politically palatable, was nonetheless fruitless
for the Palestinian cause.'47
Progress on the "peace process" came to an eventual halt as Israel began ac-
tive colonization efforts in the West Bank under the Likud's, a newly empow-
ered political party's control.'48 Land restraints and restrictions on land acquisi-
tions were removed after 1979, effectively allowing the Israeli government to
seize any area in Gaza considered desirable for settlement. 14 9 This colonization,
including active efforts to increase Jewish settlements, also involved the drain-
ing of Palestinian water sources.' 0 Israel's Likud colonization, along with a
refusal to withdraw from the West Bank and Gaza, showed that the road to
peace was still far from paved.
Creation of the PLO
The current Palestinian authority, the PLO, also the same governing author-
ity that dealt with both Kissinger and the UN in 1974, was formed after a meet-
ing in January of 1964 where Arab heads of state formulated a reply to Israel's
plans to remove water from the Sea of Galilee. 5' The delegates called for the
creation of Palestinian commando units that would carry out sabotage operations
against Israeli water installations, and more importantly, "the necessary practical
decisions were taken . . . in the field of organizing the Palestinian people and
enabling them to play their role in the liberation of their country and their self-
determination." 52 These steps empowered the Palestinian representative to the
Arab league, Ahmad Shuqayuri, to come forward with plans for the establish-
ment of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, the official representative of the
Palestinian people.5 3
147. See CHOMSKY, supra note 25, at 61-63.
148. See TESSLER, supra note 10, at 516; see generally MERON BENVENISTI, THE WEST BANK
DATA PROJECT: A SURVEY OF ISRAEL'S POLICIES (1984). Benvenisti, former deputy mayor of
Jerusalem, explains that all the new settlements built following Likud's rise to power caused the
number of Jewish settlers to increase five times in a three year period. See also MERON BENVENISTI,
THE WEST BANK DATA PROJECT: REPORT (1986); WILLIAM W. HARRIS, TAKING ROOT: ISRAELI
SETTLEMENT IN THE WEST BANK, THE GOLAN, AND GAZA-SINAI, 1967-1980 (1980); DAVID OTT,
PALESTINE IN PERSPECTIVE: POLITICS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE WEST BANK (1980).
149. DON PERETZ, THE WEST BANK: HISTORY, POLITICS, SOCIETY AND ECONOMY 66 (1986).
150. ABDALLAH FRANJI, THE PLO AND PALESTINE 117 (1983). Franji claims that not a single
Palestinian was allowed to sink a new well for agricultural purposes and only seven new wells for
drinking water were permitted. See also PERETZ, supra note 149, at 65.
151. See COBBAN, supra note 102, at 28-29; see also supra notes 137-40 and accompanying
text.
152. See COBBAN, supra note 102, at 28-29.
153. Id.
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In 1968, Shuqayri set forth the Declaration of the Creation of the PLO, in
the "Palestinian National Charter," underlining the basic goals of the Palestinian
people:
Article 2. Palestine, within the boundaries it had during the British Mandate, is an indivisible
territorial unit.
Article 5. Palestinians are those Arab nationals who, until 1947, had normally resided in Pal-
estine, regardless of whether they have been evicted from it or have stayed there. Anyone
born after that date of a Palestinian father, whether inside Palestine or outside it, is also a Pal-
estinian.
Article 19. The partition of Palestine in 1947 and the state of establishment of Israel are en-
tirely illegal, regardless of the passage of time, because they were contrary to the will of the
Palestinian people and to their natural right in their homeland, and inconsistent with the prin-
ciples embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, particularly the right to self-
determination.
154
A second document approved by the Arab council delegate was the Draft
Constitution of the PLO, which established the Palestine National Council as the
parliament of the Palestinians, a fifteen-member Executive Committee would be
elected by PNC, who in turn would elect the PLO's chairman, as well as the
Palestine National Fund whose duty was to raise money. 155
Pushing Nationalism to the People: Learning to Hate
In viewing the development of the conflict, it is essential to not only pin-
point the dividing lines between the parties, but more importantly to also see
how the different positions advance within their perspective communities. Re-
luctant to minimalize the merits of the parties' positions, the inescapable fact is
that peace will not be realized as long as fundamentally inconsistent positions
are aggressively fostered in the minds of those between whom we expect to see
peace. How can the Palestinians and Israelis be at peace when the Palestinians
are taught that their plight is to be at war? How can these two people not be at
154. Palestinian National Charter, available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.aspMFAHOOpvO;
see also TESSLER, supra note 10, at 374, noting that it has been argued that the creation of the PLO
was not to give expression to Palestinian desires for self-determination, but rather to restrain the
Palestinian resistance movement in order to prevent existing guerrilla organizations, such as the
Fatah, from drawing the Arab states into a war with Israel.
155. WILLIAM QUANDT, ET AL., THE POLITICS OF PALESTINIAN NATIONALISM 69 (1973).
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war when Israel continues to colonize a land of another, further strengthening
the Palestinian's plight? 56 In the PLO Constitution an "Awakening Committee"
was established with a sole purpose to "study ways and means for the upbring-
ing of the new generations both ideologically and spiritually so they may serve
their country and work for the liberation of their homeland."' 57 After the Camp
David Accord, Likud's leadership set Jerusalem to the task of placing physical
and political obstacles in the path of those who argued that the Jewish state
should seriously explore the opportunity for a comprehensive peace that Camp
David appeared to offer.'5"
Leaving History Behind
In the intervening years, Arafat has stayed in power, Israel has continued its
expansion into Palestinian owned lands through "settlements," the "radical"
Islamic Palestinian factions have continued to wreak havoc in the Israel state
through "suicide bombings," and the Likud remains in control. 59 And still -
there is no peace. "Roadmap" after "Roadmap" has failed, and some are begin-
ning to doubt if there will ever be a solution to the conflict. We must not, how-
ever, give up on the hope for peace. While it may not be wrong to fight, it may
indeed be man's worst sin if he knows how not to fight. Through exploration of
the negotiation process you will see a glimpse of how peace might finally land
on a road from Israel to Palestine. By expanding our vision of what could be,
and should be, we produce hope and possibilities - either of which, when ap-
propriately guided, can bring down the strongest of walls any nation may
build.' 6'
156. As an illustration, I offer a story told to me by the Honorable Mike Wood. While Judge
Wood was in Washington, D.C. for a meeting he began discussing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
and was surprised to find out that a man at the meeting was, in fact, Palestinian. The Palestinian
man explained to Judge Wood and others that Israel attempted to take away the land that had been in
his family's possession for 1350 years. "As long as that is happening," said the Palestinian man,
"there will be no peace in Israel." Special thanks to Judge Mike Wood (Harris County Probate Court
#2) and his wife, Judge Sharolyn Wood (127"h District Court of Texas), without whom I would not
be who, where, or what I am today.
157. See Draft Constitution of the PLO, available at http://www.jmcc.org/politics/plo/
ploconstitu.htm.
158. See TESSLER, supra note 10, at 370-96.
159. See Israel's Likud Grows in Strength, BBC ONLINE, Feb. 2003, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/middleeast/2734265.stm.
160. See Germany: History, The Era of Partition, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRrrANNICA, retrieved Dec.
12, 2003, from Encyclopaedia Britannica Premium Service, available at http://www.britannica.coneb/
article-?eu= 10916 1, discussing the fall of the Berlin Wall.
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NEGOTIATING - DEFINING THE PROCESS
Having explored the factual development behind the conflict, the process of
negotiation must now be explored with an eye towards application to the current
situation. The remainder of the article focuses on the process of, and obstacles
to, negotiation and how its elements may be applied, at least in part, to begin to
treat the turmoil in the Middle East. As there is no one solution to the conflict,
the following commentary represents solutions, of which there are admittedly
countless others, that may be employed to ease not only the tension, but more
importantly the needs and pains of the people currently engaged in the conflict.
With its many definitions, negotiation is simply a communication process
used to put together deals or resolve disputes. We negotiate daily: with our-
selves as we decide how to spend our free time; with our health as we commit to
taking those stairs up to the office; and even with our wives and children when
we decide to eat Mexican food instead of Italian. In negotiations, our decisions
are made in the face of uncertainty. Undoubtedly both Israelis and Palestinians
are faced with great uncertainties - the Israelis are faced with the uncertainty
that an agreement will stop the incessant bombing that has terrorized the Holy
Land since 1999, and the Palestinians are faced with the uncertainty as to the
conditions of their people and whether, even under a defined boundary agree-
ment, the Israelis will put a halt to their settlement activity.
PRINCIPLES OF NEGOTIATION
Every negotiation is a mixed motive exchange. 161
During the summer of 2000, I had the pleasure of visiting Beirut, Leba-
non. 6 2 One bright and very hot day we drove though an Islamic neighborhood
where the entire side of one building was painted: two rifles piercing through an
Israeli flag with the words "We are Coming!" written in Arabic below. These
are not just signs read by grown men who have had their homes destroyed or
161. ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984).
162. For those wanting to get a better understanding of Beirut, see generally THOMAS L.
FRIEDMAN, FROM BEIRUT TO JERUSALEM (1989). Friedman, a Jewish journalist, does an out-
standing job of providing the reader with a vivid glimpse of this city, its people, and its dangers.
Beirut, once known as the "Pearl of the Middle East" is now redeveloping under the efforts of Sol-
idere, a company started by Beirut's Prime Minister, Rafik Hariri. See http://www.solidere-
online.com/solidere.htnl, for more information on the redevelopment project and an interactive tour
of the city; see also http://www.downtownbeirut.com.
23
Nacol: Negotiating on un-Holy Land: The Road from Israel to Palestine
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2003
their brothers killed. These are signs read by the Palestinian children. It is not a
far-fetched proposition that these children are taught to hate. Hatred breeds
conflict, the archrival of peace. At the negotiating table, this emotion, along
with others, is directed by certain political and economic agendas in a dance
often known as the "mixed motive exchange."'
' 63
The underlying motives between the Israelis and the Palestinians may be
their greatest obstacle to peace. These are the motives which go unspoken at the
table, but which nonetheless dictate each party's moves as they evaluate their
gains from settlement. When parties hate one another they may be willing to
forgo a settlement in which they stand to gain if, by doing so, they can inflict
greater harm upon their enemy. By not settling, the Palestinians continue to
afflict the Israeli society by reinforcing the justification for keeping the gateway
of terror in tact. Likewise, the Israelis, in the absence of an agreement, may
continue their settlement activity - staking claim to more of this disputed land.
Therefore, solutions must be introduced, forcing the parties to refocus on their
own interests, instead of revenging.
The monetary need of the Palestinians is one problem spurring a motive for
their current actions. Recall that Saddam Hussein, the recently captured Iraqi
dictator, often made payments to the families of a suicide bomber in the amount
of $25,000 USD 64 Whenever killing oneself is an incentive to provide for
one's family, the world community must look closely into the conditions of the
people being subject to such a dilemma.
Upon inspection, the poverty of the Palestinians is an issue that must be ad-
dressed before any resolution can be achieved. Were this monetary interest to
be satisfied or advanced through a financial stimulus package to the Palestinians
by an outside party, such as the U.S. or UN, the issue could be properly ad-
dressed in a civil fashion. 65 By offering a proposal with a greater incentive to
remain at peace than the current Palestinian incentive to engage in war, an out-
side party has the opportunity to intercede in a positive fashion. The Palestini-
ans' current conditions of poverty"6 afford them less of a motive to negotiate,
since they have "nothing to lose." A plan to bring the Palestinians out of pov-
163. See L. Randolph Lowry, Negotiation and Settlement Advocacy Notebook, PEPP. U. INST.
FOR Disp. RESOL. 2:1-2:10 (1995).
164. See Palestinians Get Saddam Funds, BBC ONLINE, Mar. 13, 2003, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middleeast/2846365.stm.
165. The Palestinians more recently requested $1.2 billion in aid from 14 countries, including
the sponsors of the peace plan, the EU, the UN, the United States and Russia. See Palestinians
Seeking 1.2 bn Aid, BBC ONLINE, Dec. 10, 2003, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/-
middleeast/3305513.stm.
166. See World Bank Online, Two Years of intafada, Closures and Palestinian Economic
Crisis, Mar. 5, 2003, available at http://lnwebl 8.worldbank.org/mna/mena.nsf/Attachments/
WBGsummary-ENG/$File/WBGsummary-ENG.pdf.
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erty, in the name of peace or any other, would certainly inspire them and give
them a motive to cooperate.1
67
In regards to the Israeli desires to expand their territory through settlement,
they must be continually reminded of the undesirable consequence this expan-
sion is producing - terror in their homeland. 68 Refocusing the Israelis on the
consequences of their expansion activity would reinforce their motive to enjoy
peace. Since this motive to reestablish peace, hopefully, does not ultimately
conflict with the Palestinians' desires, the possibility of settlement would there-
fore increase. 69
Claiming Value in Distributive Bargaining
Distributive bargaining characteristics include a limited-value, or "fixed
pie," negotiation with every move having substantive and symbolic value and
the result tending to be the midpoint of the first two reasonable offers. 7 ° The
two key opening strategies are opening extreme and soft, or reasonable and
firm. 17' The most important move in distributive bargaining is the initial move,
167. This can be seen in former Palestinian Prime Minister Abbas' recent trip to the White
House, where Abbas smiled as Bush reaffirmed his commitments to a Palestinian state. See Abbas
Wins White House Red Carpet, BBC ONLINE, Jul. 25, 2003, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/americas/3098265.stm.
168. See Silvan Shalom, State Budget Proposal for 2003, available at
http://www.mof.gov.il/bud2003sp.htm. Shalom, Israeli Vice Premier and Minister of Finance, stated
in pertinent part:
The Palestinian war of terrorism ignited by Yasser Arafat and his colleagues two years ago is
exacting a high price from us day in and day out, not only in terms of blood, but also in terms
of economic resources.
This war, in contrast to other wars we have endured, is no swift war, lasting six days or a
month or two months. This war has continued for more than two years.
Since the inception of the wave of terror revenues from taxes have fallen by more than NIS
15 billion. Entire industries, such as tourism, have shrunk and regressed several years. For-
eign investors, who came in droves during the euphoric times of talk about a New Middle
East, now on stand-by. Entertainment and commercial centers are not like they were in the
past. Since the onslaught of the wave of terror, the Israeli economy has lost close to 10% of
its gross domestic product, some NIS 40 billion. Id. (emphasis added)
169. See Palestinians Want Peace with Israel, AL JAZEERA.NET, Nov. 12, 2003, available at
http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/345BED79-3lE8-492E-BB5C-A74060D5892A.htm. Ahmad
Quraya, Palestinian Prime Minister Abbas' replacement, said, "Our strategic choice is to stick to
peace, to the road map and to agreements signed with Israel." Id.
170. See Lowry, supra note 163, at 2:1-2:10.
171. ld. at 2:11-12.
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which can be placed in the credible range, the insult range, or the reasonable
range.' 72 The current Israeli stance is firm: they will only exchange land if there
will be no further terrorist attacks.'73 Given the offer is firm, the question arises
as to whether the offer is reasonable.'74 In rejecting past proposals, the Pales-
tinians suggest that, while the offer may not be construed as an insult, it is un-
reasonable since it does not address the well being of the Palestinian people.'75
To rectify this incongruence, the Israelis, or another party, must put something
on the table to address the monetary needs of the Palestinians. The offer would
then be more reasonable to the Palestinians, creating the necessary foundation
for a settlement.
In the book The Manager as Negotiator,7 6 David Lax and James K. Seben-
ius explain the fundamentals of distributive bargaining: a bargain is called dis-
tributive when more for one means less for the other and no joint gains beyond
simple agreement exist.'77 The authors discuss the importance of shaping per-
ceptions to alternatives, and the fact that each party tries to affect the other's
perceptions of the bargaining range and where settlement is possible.' The
situation in the Middle East seems to be distributive given the fact they are deal-
ing with a fixed pie: the land formerly known as Palestine. However, there are
other elements, besides land, which figure into the equation: the benefits of
172. Id. at 2:9-2:10.
173. While Sharon agreed to "handover" Ramallah, Tulkarm, Qalqilya and Jericho even after
suicide attacks, the likelihood of this occurring is in doubt as Israel continues their raids in the West
Bank. See Israel Agrees Handover of Cities, BBC ONLINE, Aug. 15, 2003, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/-middle-east/3155361.stm; Israel Steps Up West Bank Raids, BBC
ONLINE, Dec. 3, 2003, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middleeast/3287537.stm. "Some
Israeli analysts think [Sharon's recent] talk of painful concessions [in the recent negotiations] is a
smokescreen meant to buy time to go on building [a barrier wall that will separate Palestinians and
Israelis]." See Barbara Plett, New Peace Plan Challenges Sharon, BBC ONLINE, Nov. 29, 2003,
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middleeast/3248434.stm. As one of Israel's newest solu-
tions, the ongoing constructing of the barrier wall is being internationally questioned. See Court to
Examine Israeli Barrier, BBC ONLINE, Dec. 8, 2003, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle-east/3301265.stm. The UN General Assembly recently approved
a resolution asking the International Court of Justice to consider the legality of the Israeli tactics for
keeping peace. Id. Pope John Paul II criticized the wall as a "obstacle on the road leading to peace-
ful cohabitation." See Sharon Urges Jews to Go to Israel, BBC ONLINE, Nov. 17, 2003, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2hii/niiddle-east/3275979.stm.
174. See supra notes 17land 173 and accompanying text.
175. See Arafat's Ceasefire Call Rejected, BBC ONLINE, Aug. 28, 2003, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middleeast/3187491.stm. Ahmed Querie, speaker of the Palestinian
Legislative Council said, "We also share a belief that prosperity is the key to long-term peace, and
want to create more jobs in the Palestinian Authority's region." See Jordan's Intervention Saves
Israeli-Palestinian Talks, CNN ONLINE, Jul. 22, 1998, available at httpJ/edition.cnn.com/WORLD/meastl
9807/221-mideast.peace/index.html.
176. See generally DAVID LAX & JAMES K. SEBENIUs, THE MANAGER As NEGOTIATOR (1986).
177. Id.
178. Id.
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peace for Israel and the well being of the Palestinian people. 79 These considera-
tions for peace and prosperity refute the characterization of the negotiation as a
"fixed pie" since they show there is more to be bargained for than merely con-
trol of land.
Shifting from Distributive to Integrative Bargaining
Distributive bargaining tends to motivate competitive and aggressive strate-
gies which harm relationships and is characterized by the idea of a "fixed pie" to
be divided between two individuals." s° Right now, both Israel and the Palestini-
ans remain focused on their positions, a characteristic of distributive bargain-
ing. '8  Integrative bargaining focuses on interests instead of positions.'12 By
refocusing on interests an integrative bargainer may "go below the line" to find
out what is driving the parties' conflicting positions.8 3 Life in a refugee camp,
surrounded by walls, in a land they believe to be their own is unacceptable to the
Palestinians.'8' While the land is important to the Palestinians, if they were to
settle the land dispute today, they would still be in a state of economic and struc-
tural despair - these "below the line issues" need to be addressed.'85
An outside party needs to provide an incentive for the Palestinians to settle.
Foreign aid helping to rebuild the Palestinian nation diminishes the distributive
nature of the agreement from the Palestinian perspective by giving them more
179. See supra note 168 and accompanying text; infra note 201 and accompanying text.
180. See RUSSEL KOROBKIN, NEGOTIATION - THEORY AND STRATEGY 121, 127-28 (2002).
Korobkin discusses the differences between distributive and integrative bargaining, and explains the
preference and advantages of integrative bargaining. Id. See also Lowry, supra note 163, at 3:12-
13.
181. See supra note 170, at 3:6; see also Veteran Israeli Sceptical about Peace, BBC ONLINE,
Dec. 1, 2003, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3252656.stm. As Israel speaks of
unilateral measures to satisfy their interests, the Palestinians introduce a new sticking point, the
"Right of Return," which would allow tens of thousands of Palestinians refugees to return to their
home in Israel. Id. See also Lowry, supra note 163, at 3:1-6.
182. See KOROBKIN, supra note 180, at 134. Korobkin's chapter on integrative bargaining
explains the importance of focusing on ultimate interests rather than superficial positions. Id. See
also FISHER AND URY, supra note 127, at 40; Lowry, supra note 163, at 3:9.
183. See Lowry, supra note 163, at 3:6.
184. See supra note 173; see also Doubts over W. Bank Barrier Route, BBC ONLINE, Dec. 9,
2003, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middleeast/3302637.stm. "'The wall is a false excuse
used as a justification for colonising [sic] our land and establishing settlements,' said Nasser al-
Kidwa, the Palestinian UN observer who proposed the [UN resolution requesting that the Interna-
tional Court of Justice review the legality of the Israeli wall]." Id.
185. See id; see infra note 200 and accompanying text.
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value to claim in an agreement than merely land or recognition.8 6 In 2001,
Israel received $5 billion in aid from the U.S. government. 87 The Palestinians
recently received a pledge from the entire worldwide community in April of
2002 for $1.2 billion of emergency humanitarian relief to rebuild the West Bank
infrastructure; 188 this figure surpasses the normal annual amount of aid granted
to Palestinians by the U.S. and world community combined. 8 9 Were the United
States, or a collection of states, to temporarily commit to a Palestinian stimulus
package to compete with the U.S.' backing of Israel, the nature of the bargaining
process would become more integrative, rather than distributive, because the
Palestinians would be presented with an alternative - an alternative that stands
a greater chance of being valued as preferable to non-settlement since it ad-
dresses a "below the line" interest unsatisfied by proposals based solely on
land.' 9°
To this effect, the Bush administration recently offered an additional $67
million USD to the Palestinian causes of education, economic developments,
water projects, and medical care.' 9' However, even considering the yearly totals
of over $267 million in U.S. aid to the Palestinians, this number pales in com-
parison to the annual $3 billion the U.S. will give to Israel, and especially to the
over $100 billion given to Israel since 1949.192 Clearly, more needs to be put on
the table for the Palestinians to draw an increased willingness to make peace
with Israel.
Defining the Interests of the Parties
A determination of the interests of the Israelis seems problematic at first.
With the past Zionist movement, current settlement activity, and current con-
struction of a dividing wall reminiscent of that once dividing East and West
Germany,'93 Israel shows interest in occupying the land defined by the bounda-
186. See Lowry, supra note 163, at 3:3-6.
187. See Susan Abulhawa, U.S. Aid to Israel - Tax Dollars Soaked in Blood, Jan. 2001, avail-
able at http://www.mediamonitors.net/susan3.html. In addition to the $5,000,000,000 in aid, Israel
obtains the benefits of "gifts" like the Arrow Missile and Levi Fighter, totaling $1.3 billion. Id.
188. See Yousif Madani, International Community Allocates One Billion Dollars in West Bank
Aid, PALESTINE ECONOMICS (2002); see also supra note 165.
189. See Arab American Institute Online, Foreign Aid, available at http://www.aaiusa.org/for-
eign.aid.htm.
190. See FISHER AND URY, supra note 127, at Ch. 4. Ury discusses the importance of inventing
options for mutual gain. Id.
19 1. See United States Embassy Online, U.S. Offers Additional $67 Million to Aid Palestinian
Refugees, May 22, 2003, available at http://www.usembassy.it/file2003_O5/alia/A3052205.htm.
192. See Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, The Strategic Functions of the U.S. Aid to
Israel available at http://www.wrmea.com. The website highlights a fact that some Americans may
not know: Israel gets one-third of all U.S. foreign aid. Id.
193. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
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ries of ancient Israel. 9 4 However, with their past offer to cease settlements in
exchange for peace,195 the Israelis have shown that their overriding interest is
peace. The exact interests of the Palestinians are not as difficult to determine.
Their current demands' 96 show their interests not only include possession of
land,'97 but also in statehood recognition"' and prosperity.' 99 Currently, manyPalestinians are living as refugees in half-demolished cities resulting from the
194. See Full Text: Sharon's Address, BBC ONLINE, Dec. 4, 2001, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/-2/hi/world/monitoring/media-reports/1690673.stm. Israeli Prime Minister
Sharon addressed the nation as the Israeli army launched attacks in Gaza and the West Bank, in
retaliation for Palestinian suicide attacks killing at least 25 Israelis. Id. Sharon said, "[The purpose
of those behind the attacks] is to bring us to total despair, to the loss of hope, to the loss of the na-
tional vision which leads us to be a free nation in our land, the land of Zion and Jerusalem." Id.
(emphasis added)
195. See Israel Offers Settler Deal, BBC ONLINE, May 18, 2001, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/-middleeast/1336913.stm.
196. See Texts: Palestinian Truces, BBC ONLINE, Jun. 29, 2003, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/-2/hi/middleeast/-3030480.stm. The article includes the text of Hamas and
Islamic Jihad Declaration of Initiative, detailing their demands on Israel, which included:
I) The immediate halt of all forms of Zionist aggression against our Palestinian people to in-
clude incursions, destruction, closures, siege on the cities, villages and camps; as well as the
siege imposed on President Yasser Arafat; the demolition of houses; the bulldozing of agri-
cultural land; encroachment on lands, property, and the Islamic and Christian holy places,
particularly the Holy AI-Aqsa Mosque.
2) Lifting the siege clamped on the Palestinian people and their elected legitimate leadership
headed by brother President Abu-Ammar [Yasser Arafat];
3) Releasing the prisoners and detainees held in Israeli jails;
4) Stopping encroachment on the Islamic and Christian holy places, particularly the Holy al-
Aqsa Mosque, the Church of Holy Sepulchre, the Holy Ibrahimi Mosque and the Church of
the Nativity;
5) Immediately halting the confiscation of land, the building of settlements on it and the ex-
pansion of the existing ones so as to pave the way for dismantling them; as well as stopping
the construction of separation walls and fences;
6) Starting the occupation forces' withdrawal to the areas where they were before 28 Septem-
ber 2000 and expediting the dispatch of international observers to supervise the implementa-
tion of the agreed-upon terms of reference of the peace process in accordance with the resolu-
tions of international legitimacy with the objective of achieving a just, lasting and compre-
hensive peace in the region.
It is a revolution until victory. Id.
197. See supra notes 36 and 86 and accompanying text.
198. See Louisa Brooke, Politics and the Palestinian Issue, BBC ONLINE, Jan. 23, 2003, avail-
able at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middleeast/2683613.stm. Brooke discusses the Palestinian
statehood issue and gives the positions of the parties on the subject. Id.
199. See KOROBKIN, supra note 180, at 137-38. Korobkin writes that the most powerful inter-
est are basic human needs, which include security, economic well-being, a sense of belonging,
recognition, and control over one's life. Id.
29
Nacol: Negotiating on un-Holy Land: The Road from Israel to Palestine
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2003
recent Israeli military efforts to weed out terrorists from the Palestinian towns. 200
Their interest in the land may be seen as of much less value when living condi-
tions are so intolerable.2 °' Undoubtedly, the Palestinians, like all people, have
an interest in their own prosperity. 202 Therefore both sides have at least one
aligned interest: the safety and well being of their people.
In Getting to Yes, the authors explain that after determining the interests of
the parties, it is necessary to invent options for mutual gain.20 3 By assuming
there is a fixed pie,2' the bargain remains distributive, which has already been
explained as an inefficient approach to settlement.20 5 Through a process of in-
venting creative options, the negotiation becomes more integrative in nature.' °
By approaching the Israelis and Palestinians prior to a settlement attempt and
requesting they consider alternative options, or other compensations not pres-
ently contemplated by the parties, the two would have the opportunity to expand
their settlement range.20 7 Local "town-hall" meetings, inviting discourse and
suggestions from the people of the land, would achieve this purpose, and also
produce the benefit of giving a voice to the people in solving their own dispute.
While such an idea may fly in the face of what seems practical between the par-
ties, this is exactly the type of communication that could foster the two parties'
mutual understanding and recognition of the interests at hand. On an interna-
tional level, invitations could be made to worldwide scholars to attend a united
conference on the matter; the UN seems an appropriate party to head up such an
international effort. In the case of such a lingering conflict, which the parties
have been unable to resolve, inviting the world community to offer creative
options could prove invaluable to its resolution. In addition, a more organized,
worldwide effort on the Internet could serve to invite dialogue and spur ideas on
resolving the conflict. These collaborative efforts would further define the in-
terests of the parties and expand the possible settlement range by inventing new
200. See supra note 173 and accompanying text; see also Boy among Dead in Ramallah Raid,
BBC ONLINE, Dec. 1, 2003, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3252048.stm; U.S.
Peace Activist Killed in Gaza, BBC ONLINE, Mar. 16, 2003, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle-east2855263.stm.
201. See Palestinian Refugees Pessimistic, BBC ONLINE, Mar. 26, 2002, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middleeast/1894108.stm. The article describes Palestinians conditions,
"Open sewers, no telephone lines and barely any electricity make for often-dismal living conditions.
There is a lot of frustration here and a feeling that the world has forgotten about Palestinian refu-
gees." Id.
202. See supra notes 192-200 and accompanying text.
203. See FISHER AND URY, supra note 127, at 56.
204. See Lowry, supra note 163, at 3:3. The term "fixed pie" describes the situation with a
fixed amount of resources available for distribution to the parties so that effectively, if one takes
more, the other must take less. Id.
205. See id.; see also KOROBKIN, supra note 180 and accompanying text.
206. See Lowry, supra note 163, at 3:2; see also KOROBKIN, supra note 180, at 130-32 for a
discussion on adding or subtracting issues and its effect on integrative bargaining. Id.
207. See Lowry, supra note 163, at 2:8.
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ideas, therefore making the process more integrative and ultimately increasing
the odds of settlement.
2 8
Power of Alternatives /Limits to Negotiation
In The Power of Alternatives or the Limits to Negotiation,2°9 David A. Lax
and James K. Sebenius explain how in a negotiation the parties' best alternatives
without agreement imply the limits to any agreement. The authors explain,
"[f]or each side, the best test of any proposed joint agreement is whether it of-
fers a higher subjective worth than that side's best course of action absent
agreement."21 The risk, they argue, on focusing on the alternatives as the limits
of the negotiation, is that the potential is ignored and that each side could help
reach an agreement that each would value more than its best alternative. 21' This
is based on the premise that the value of negotiation lies in the gains from coop-
212eration.
The best alternative to non-settlement for Israel includes not only more sui-
cide bombings and domestic unrest, but also more settlement of the disputed
territories. The best alternatives for the Palestinians include continued "martyr-
dom" by suicide bombers inflicting terror in Israel, continued loss of land, and
only the hopes of increasing world-wide support for the Palestinian state. Ap-
plying the principles in Lax's article, the danger in focusing on these alternatives
to settlement is that the potential gains from cooperation are ignored. While the
Israelis demand peace for land, the Palestinians demand land for peace, and each
side's hands are tightly clenched as they ignore the more important question:
How much better the land would be if there were peace and prosperity for all?
Last summer while in Beirut, my friends and I took a tour of the city. We
traveled the streets dividing the city's eastern and western halves that served as
the boundary line between the Christian and Muslims in the civil war from 1975
to 1983.213 As we drove, one thing became apparent: in trying to win control of
the thing they treasured most, the Beirutis had destroyed this treasure, their
208. Id.
209. See LAX AND SEBENIUS, supra note 176, at 163.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. See Lowry, supra note 163, at 3:2, 3:12-3.
213. See Timeline: Lebanon, BBC ONLINE, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_
east/country_-profiles/819200.stm.
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home, Beirut.2" 4 The fallen buildings and still-rubbled streets were proof that the
"best alternatives" led to a result in which neither party was rewarded. Like the
Israelis and the Palestinians, their inability to focus on the gains from an agree-
ment led to their homeland's demise.2"5 Beirut, once known as the "Paris of the
Middle East," is just now showing signs of returning to its former glory. 2'6 Let
us hope that the Israelis and Palestinians are able to see the potential in reaching
an agreement; for as they delay, this "Holy Land" is being thrown into the an-
tithesis of what any man or leader could ever define as "glory. 217
Lax notes:
[I]f negotiation is seen as a means of doing better by joint action than would be possible oth-
erwise, it should not be surprising that non-negotiation courses of action will sometimes
prove to be the superior means .... A clear-headed focus on the alternatives may help clarify
this judgment. 2
18
The next section explores how the parties might clarify their current judg-
ment of preferring non-settlement. The process involves one of the most basic,
yet difficult, means of addressing the needs of another: listening.
EMPATHIC COMMUNICATION IN A LAND WITH NO EMPATHY
In the Seven Habits of Highly Effective People, in a chapter entitled "Princi-
ples of Empathic Communication," Stephen R. Covey explains the importance
of first seeking to understand and then to be understood. 219 Empathic listening
allows one to understand the speaker with the goal of grasping the other's true
frame of reference. The analogy of a doctor who prescribes a treatment before
performing a proper diagnosis sheds light on the problems of not engaging in
empathic listening. Just as every good doctor knows he must make a proper
214. See Marilyn Raschka, Beirut Digs Out, available at http://www.archaeology.org/maga-
zine.php?-page=9607/abstracts/beirut, explaining Lebanese folklore that Beirut has been destroyed
and rebuilt seven times within its 5,000-year history. See also http://www.downtownbeirut.com.
215. See Beirut: Physical and Human Geography, ENCYCLOPfEDIA BRITANNICA, retrieved
Dec. 13, 2003, from Encyclopaedia Britannica Premium Service, available at
http://www.britannica.comleb/article?-eu=l 17198.
216. See Kim Ghattas, Beirut Given Summit Facelift, BBC ONLINE, Mar. 25, 2002, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middleeast/1892971.stm; see also supra note 162, regarding Solidere's
rebuilding Beirut.
217. See Pope Calls for Middle East Peace, BBC ONLINE, Jan. 1, 2003, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2619855.stm. In his 2003 New Year speech, Pope John Paul II
appealed for peace in the Middle East, saying, "How not to look at that holy place where Jesus was
born with anxiety and sorrow? Bethlehem, the Holy Land." Id.
218. Id.
219. STEPHEN R. COVEY, THE SEVEN HABITS OF HIGHLY EFFECTIVE PEOPLE 44 (1997).
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diagnosis before treating an ailment, only after understanding your opponent's
position in a negotiation can you properly accommodate that party's interests.
Covey describes the basis of the Greek philosophy, which reflect the proc-
ess of empathic listening - ethos, pathos, and logos:
Ethos is your personal credibility, the faith people have in your integrity and competency.
It's the trust that you inspire, your Emotional Bank Account. Pathos is the empathic side -
it's the feeling. It means that you are in alignment with the emotional thrust of another per-
son's communication. Logos is the logic, the reasoning pan of the presentation.
220
Many falter, ignoring the order of these precepts by trying to argue based on
logic without first taking ethos and pathos into consideration. 221 Without first
establishing credibility and then aligning yourself with emotional stance of your
opponent, the reasoning that results may be quite the contrary - unreasonable.
In the Middle East, empathic listening is nearly nonexistent between the par-
ties. 222 Instead of attempting to establish credibility or engaging in dialogues to
understand each other's positions, the parties focus on external communications
in an effort to propagandize world spectators to gain support or justify their
actions. 113
A major step towards resolving the conflict is enabling the parties to engage
in empathic communication. The parties must have access to a medium or fo-
rum through which they can identify with the other party's grievances. By hear-
ing from the parties first-hand, the credibility of each side would be established.
I envision a UN summit where the common people are invited to share their
opinions, or, where the UN could moderate "town-hall" meetings where each
side could learn how to best accommodate the other party's needs and identify
220. Id. at 65.
221. Id.
222. See, e.g., Sharon Rejects Halt on Barrier, BBC ONLINE, Nov. 30, 2003, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2hi/middle_east/3249414.stm; Paul Reynolds, Israeli Anger Grows at Arafat,
BBC ONLINE, Sep. 17, 2003, available at hUp://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/niddle east/3103420.stm. The
latter article explains the right-wing Jewish sentiment as reflected in the Jerusalem Post. Id. The
article quotes the newspaper:
"The world will not help us; we must help ourselves. We must kill as many of the Hamas and
Islamic Jihad leaders as possible, as quickly possible, while minimizing collateral damage,
but not letting that damage stop us. And we must kill Yasser Arafat, because the world leaves
us no alternative."
See also Sheikh Yassin: Spiritual Figurehead, BBC ONLINE, Oct. 30, 2003, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middleeast/1695470.stm. Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, spiritual leader of
Hamas, who just survived an Israeli-led assassination attempt in September of 2003, said, "The so-
called peace path is not peace and it is not a substitute for jihad and resistance." Id.
223. See, e.g., Fatah Denies Militant 'Funding,' BBC ONLINE, Nov. 8, 2003, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middleeast/3253529.stm.
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with the other's grievances. Only by fostering some form of empathic listening
between the parties can the correct diagnosis be made to treat the ailments of the
parties.
Checkpoint Israel's Checkpoint Watch
On December 30, 2002, National Public Radio correspondent Linda Grad-
stein reported on a new group of Israeli women who have launched an organiza-
tion, Machsom Watch, to observe the Israeli army checkpoints in the occupied
West Bank.224 The group was formed in response to reports of beatings and
abuses by Israeli soldiers at checkpoints. 225 Recognizing that the majority of
Palestinians have their only interaction with Israelis at checkpoints when Israeli
soldiers stop them, the group hopes their presence and ability to report abuses
will positively impact the interaction.226 The women are determined to make a
personal contribution to easing relations between Israelis and Palestinians.
227
After recognizing her efforts may interfere with the functioning of the soldiers,
one woman said, "I was ashamed of what was being done in my name... I felt I
needed to do more than just demonstrations . . .I needed to do something to
change the situation. 228
One member of the Israeli group, made up of mostly women, said "Pales-
tinians have told her that the soldiers behave more politely when members of her
group are present." '229 Explaining the effect on one Palestinian, one member told
the reporter about a Palestinian who passed by and shook their hands, and said,
"Thank you for being here." 23 ° The group currently has eighty volunteers who
observe checkpoints at least once a week, usually during the most crowded
times, and who write and deliver weekly to human rights groups and Israeli
Knesset members. 231 This example of a positive movement towards understand-
ing, or empathy, is ultimately representative of the type of action that must occur
before the resolution of the conflict may occur.
224. See LINDA GRANSTEIN, Checkpoint Watch, National Public Radio, Dec. 30, 2002, avail-
able at http://www.npr.org.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
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THE BENEFITS OF INTEGRATIVE BARGAINING OVER DISTRIBUTIVE BARGAINING
Integrative bargaining is more efficient than distributive bargaining because
less time is wasted on gamesmanship.2 32 Additionally, one drawback of negoti-
ating over positions in distributive bargaining occurs when parties lock them-
selves into "frames of reference" they cannot concede without "losing face.
'2 33
For both the Israelis and Palestinians, losing face would be a sign of weakness,
something no Middle Eastern country desires to portray.2  The Palestinians, in
particular, cannot afford to lose face because their very recognition is at stake.235
Of equal importance to the Israelis is not showing signs of weakness to their
threatening Arab neighbors. 36 Having already refused a deal to exchange land
for peace and recognition,237 the Palestinians need to be offered more on the
negotiation table in order to justify their acceptance of a proposal. For example,
a significant third-party contribution to the Palestinians' economic development,
offered in addition the parties' current demands, would guard either side from
losing face, which would otherwise result from making additional concessions
or accepting a previously rejected proposal.23
232. See Lowry, supra note 163, at 3:12.
233. See id. at 3:22. Lowry also notes the risk of losing creditability in making substantial
concessions, particularly after making an extreme, or unreasonable offer. Id. at 2:11.
234. See Charles Wolfson, Mideast Plans Proliferate, CBSNEWS ONLINE, Jul. 20, 2002, avail-
able at http://www.cbsnews.comstories/2002/07/19/opinion/diplomatic/main515700.shtml. "In the
Middle East peace process, no one wants to make the first move, lest it be taken as a sign of weak-
ness." Id.
235. See supra note 198.
236. See supra note 232; see also Arab-Israeli Wars, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, retrieved
Dec. 14, 2003, from Encyclopedia Britannica Premium Service, available at
http://www.britannica.comleb/-article?eu=8252.
237. See, e.g., Palestinian Full Truce Talks Fail, BBC ONLINE, Dec. 7, 2003, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middleeast/3297047.stm. Even with a "roadmap" on the table that
includes provisions for Palestinian statehood, Palestinian leaders are unable to agree to a cease-fire.
Id. Their unwillingness to agree to, or incapacity to institute such a cease-fire constitutes a rejection
of any proposal on the negotiating table. Id.
238. See Analysis: Paying for Peace, BBC ONLINE, Jul. 17, 2000, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
middle east/837478.stm. Some have estimated that the price tag on a plan for peace could run as
much as $40 billion USD. Id. See also supra note 233; FISHER AND URY, supra note 127, at 5.
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Separating the People from the Problems
In Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In,23 9 the authors
discuss the importance of separating the people from the problem. The fact that
real people are involved at the negotiating table cannot be overlooked.24° In the
instant matter, two people are involved who have to answer to their nations.
When parties become more concerned about their negotiating positions than
about the people putting forward those positions, working relationship may be
damaged, reducing the prospect for settlement.
Because distributive bargaining tends to be more argumentative, it threatens
the parties' relationships. 4' The likelihood of the parties peacefully coexisting
is further threatened by the continued deterioration of their relationship.242 The
relationship between Sharon, the Israeli Prime Minister and Arafat, the head of
the PLO, is already in a state of disaster - to describe these leaders as enemies,
is to put it lightly. 4 3 It is possible that these two men may not reach an agree-
ment due to their personal aversions to one other.2 " In such circumstances, the
presence of a neutral party, who can communicate the problem and try to rees-
tablish a working relationship between these people becomes crucial.
Pushing the "roadmap" to peace, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell com-
pleted several Middle East visits while attempting to bring the parties towards an
239. See generally FISHER AND URY, supra note 127.
240. Id. at 18-19, 29-34.
241. See Lowry, supra note 163, at 2:5. Argument is more likely to emerge as the parties are
forced to concede in order for the other party to benefit: thus is the nature of the distribution of fixed
resources. Id.
242. See, e.g., supra note 222. The deteriorated nature of the Israelis-Palestinians relations is
beyond dispute. Id.
243. Id.; see also, e.g., Sharon, Arafat not Peacemakers, Oct. 16, 2003, available at
http://www.news24.com/News24/World/News/0,,2-10-1462_1431530,00.html (former U.S. Secre-
tary of State Madeleine Albright says, "Arafat and Sharon are two stubborn old men who hate each
other."); Analysis: Mideast Peace Hopes, CNN ONLINE, Jan. 1, 2002, available at
http://edition.cnn.com/-2002/WORLD/meast/01/Ol/mideast.prospectsl (Ari Shavit, an Israeli politi-
cal analyst, told CNN: "The two men hate each other, detest each other... ").
244. Heads of state from the U.S. and Israel continually look to individuals other than Arafat to
deal with. For instance, President George W. Bush recently rolled out the White House's red carpet
to Mahmoud Abbas in July of 2003, before saying, "The Middle East needs leaders of vision and
courage and determination to serve the interest of their people . . . Abbas is the first Palestinian
Prime Minister, and he is proving to be such a leader." See Abbas Wins White House Red Carpet,
BBC ONLINE, Jul. 25, 2003, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3098265.stm. Abbas
recently resigned and was replaced by Ahmed Qurei, with whom Ariel Sharon plans to hold talks in
the near future. See Israel Calls for Mid-East Talks, BBC ONLINE, Dec. 13, 2003, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3313325.stm. President Bush has never extended an invita-
tion to Arafat to visit the President's home. See Sharon Defiant over Israeli 'Wall', BBC ONLINE,
Jul. 30, 2003, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/-middleeast/3107935.stm.
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agreement. 245 If Powell, or any other neutral party, 246 wishes to bring the parties
to an agreement they must employ this principle of separating the people from
the problem. This would require directly addressing the problems: Palestinian
land being taken by Jewish settlements, the lack of a defined Palestinian state,
and terror in Israel. 24' After separating the problems from the people negotiat-
ing, creative solutions may develop, such as reparations from Israel to the Pales-
tinians for Israeli settled land.248 By using this principle, the negotiation be-
comes more integrative by allowing a shift in focus to the interests underlying
the problems, thereby increasing the likelihood of agreement.
2 49
Achieving a Workable Agreement
In Negotiation Strategy for Lawyers, Xavier M. Frascogna, Jr. and H. Lee
Hetherington explain that when adhering to the terms of an agreement a negotia-
tion is so one-sided that it proves to be over-burdensome, the burdened party
may find breach of the agreement as preferable to the performance under the
agreement. 2 0 In such a case, a party who was initially satisfied with a settle-
ment will be deprived of their primary objective - a workable, lasting agree-
ment."5 ' This negotiation principle is appropriate to consider when evaluating
the position of the parties. 2 Currently the parties have been unable to come to
terms on a workable agreement.2 3 Whether it be through reinstating the Pales-
tinian borders to the boundaries defined prior to the 1967 war, the creation of a
Palestinian state, or the demand that the Palestinians cease the suicide attacks,
the parties must realize that in demanding a position that is untenable to the
other side, they may be striving towards an agreement that is unworkable.2 4
245. See, e.g., U.S. Department of State Online, Middle East Peace Chronology - 2000 -
2002, available at http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/nea/summit/chron.htm; Israel Calls for Mid-East
talks, BBC ONLINE, Dec. 13, 2003, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middleeast/3313325.stm.
246. The Arabs may question the neutrality of a U.S. diplomat. See, e.g.,Mid-East Press Scep-
tical of Rice Visit, BBC ONLINE, Jun. 25, 2003, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/-
middleeast/3019980.stm. The BBC reports on Arab opinion that U.S. National Security Adviser
Condoleezza Rice visited the region in June of 2003 merely to put pressure on the Palestinians. Id.
247. See supra notes 148, 168, 184, and 197-98 and accompanying text.
248. Id.
249. See FISHER AND URY, supra note 127, at 17.
250. XAVIER M. FRASCOGNA AND H. LEE HETHERINGTON, NEGOTIATION STRATEGY FOR
LAWYERS 22-40 (2001).
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. See supra note 237.
254. See generally FRASCOGNA AND HETHERINGTON, supra note 250.
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More specifically, any deal that does not address the basic human needs of the
Palestinians may prove unworkable since they may choose to fight rather than
live in continued despair. 5 The Palestinians need a plan that offers hope: hope
of making a decent living in a decent town and to giving their children a better
life than that of a refugee camp.
Is Arafat Willing to Settle?
While the above principles may work in theory, they may prove ineffective
if a party is unwilling to negotiate. Some believe that Arafat does not, in fact,
want to reach an agreement with Israel.256 The issue of how to deal with a party
who does not want to settle is a difficult one. In Getting Past No: Dealing with
Difficult People,257 William Ury describes a useful tool in dealing with an oppo-
nent who thinks he can win without negotiating. Using an example of a hostage
situation, Ury explains the processes by which you can encourage another party
to-negotiate: 1) control your own behavior, 2) create a favorable climate, 3)
direct the opponent's attention to the problem of meeting each side's interests,
4) satisfy his unmet interests and make the outcome appear as a victory for him,
and 5) educate your opponent regarding the benefits of negotiating and use
power to bring him to his senses. 258 These empathic principles further an inte-
grative bargaining approach by focusing on the interests and aligning the par-
ties.259
The First Principle, controlling one's own behavior, seems particularly
problematic considering the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. With Israeli Prime Min-
ister Sharon's strong-arm tactics and the continued Palestinians insurgence,
neither party seems able or willing to control their own behavior." Time and
time again, the lack of Palestinian control has served as the barrier to continuing
the peace process. 261' The job of negotiator is to manage the tension between
competitive and cooperative tactics. Undoubtedly, this is precisely what Powell
was trying to achieve during his recent visits to the region; however, is it possi-
ble that the parties misinterpreted actions of the suicide bomber who blew him-
255. See supra note 201.
256. See Benjamin Netanyahu, Visions for Peace, Jun. 17, 2002, available at
http://www.netanyahu.org/visforpeacto.html. Netanyahu, former Israeli Prime Minister, writes, "But
five Israeli prime ministers have been unable to make peace with Arafat for a simple reason: Arafat
does not want peace." Id. Netanyahu wrote several books dealing with international terrorism and
achieving peace. See, e.g., BENJAMIN NETANYAHU, A DURABLE PEACE: ISRAEL AND ITS PLACE
AMONG THE NATIONS (2000).
257. CHARLES B. WIGGINS & L. RANDOLPH LOWRY, NEGOTIATION AND SETrLEMENT
ADVOCACY: A BOOK OF READINGS 105-09 (1997).
258. See FISHER AND URY, supra note 127.
259. See id. at 40; see also supra note 183.
260. See supra notes 173 and 237 and accompanying text.
261. See, e.g., supra note 173.
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self moments before the roadmap's unveiling? 26 2  Israel stated the bombing
"showed the new [Palestinian] administration's 'complete failure' to get to grips
with the security situation." '263 The incident could be viewed, however, as a
competitive tactic by the Palestinians used to show Israel exactly what it has to
lose by not making concessions during peace negotiations. This could be reason
enough why in the more recent talks during the summer of 2003, Prime Minister
Sharon has tolerated additional bombings during the push for the roadmap in-
stead of unequivocally backing out of negotiations.
2 4
Reaching a deal that Arafat can claim as a victory for the Palestinians is of
unquestionable importance.265 In addition, it seems that both parties need to be
educated by an independent source as to the benefits of peace.26 The world
community could also benefit from an education on the living conditions of the
Palestinians as well as the state of terror within Israel. In order to achieve this,
an international commission should be sent to the Palestinian refugee camps and
to Israel. The findings of such could then be used as an educational tool for all
parties involved, from which Palestinians and Israelis alike could gauge their
gains from settlement. With this vantagepoint in mind, either the UN, or the
U.S., could offer an economic recovery proposal for Arafat to consider. This
process would educate the parties as to the benefits of a settlement, and may
lead to an agreement that each party could hold out as a victory.
FINAL THOUGHTS ON A SETTLEMENT
In conclusion, in order for any agreement between the Palestinians and the
Israelis to succeed, the parties must have satisfaction with the process, the sub-
stance, and the emotional and psychological ramifications of the agreement. As
262. See New Mid-East Peace Plan Launched, BBC ONLINE, Apr. 30, 2003, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2988373.stm.
263. Id.
264. See Bus Bomb Carnage in Jerusalem, BBC ONLINE, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/middleeast/3165279.stm, reporting on a blast killing twenty peo-
ple and injuring eighty others. The bombing occurred just as Abbas was meeting with Islamic Jihad
leaders in the Gaza Strip in a new effort to persuade them to halt attacks. Id.
265. See supra note 244 and accompanying text; see also Bill Maxwell, U.S. Policy of Blaming
the Victim Leaves Palestinians no Hope, Aug. 10, 2003, available at
http://www.sptimes.com/20O3/08/1O/-Columns/US-policyfoLblaming_.shtml; see also Middle East
and North Africa: Middle Eastern and North African Affairs, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, re-
trieved Dec. 17, 2003, from Encyclopaedia Britannica Premium Service, available at
http://www.britannica.com/eb/article?eu=125387. Prior attempts to settle by Arafat resulted in
Arafat's colleagues of accusing him of "selling out to the Israelis." Id.
266. See supra note 260.
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previously discussed, the process can be addressed through a more integrated
approach to bargaining. The substance of the agreement may be addressed by
the inventing of ideas and the intervention of a third party willing to address the
basic human needs of the Palestinian people.267 Finally, by inviting dialogue in
"town-hall" meetings, international forums, and independent fact finding com-
missions, the "below-the-line" interest of the parties can be unveiled and hope-
fully, resolved in an agreement satisfying both the mental and emotional needs
of the Jews and Palestinians. As British Prime Minister Tony Blair aptly stated
in his recent speech to the United States Congress, "You cannot teach people
hate and then ask them to practice peace. But neither can you teach people
peace except by according them dignity and granting them hope. '26 8 Therefore
let us continue to hope, encourage respect and dignity, and, dare I say, "pray for
peace. 269
267. See FISHER AND URY, supra note 127, at 56-94, for the importance of inventing options
for mutual gain.
268. Tony Blair Remarks, July 17, 2003, available at http://www.usembassy.it/file20O3_07/alia/
a3071702.htm.
269. Quran, The Cow (Al-Baqarah) 002.224, "And make not Allah, by your oaths, a hindrance
to your being righteous and observing your duty unto Him and making peace among mankind. Allah
is Hearer, Knower." Isaiah 7:45, "I form the light, and create darkness: I make peace, and create
evil: I the LORD do all these things." Matthew 5:9, "Blessed are the Peacemakers: for they shall be
called the children of God."
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